Comments on: Norms and commitments http://codepoetics.com/poetix/2009/11/24/norms-and-commitments/ mocking the ways of true grown men Sat, 06 Mar 2010 04:10:06 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: Pete Wolfendale http://codepoetics.com/poetix/2009/11/24/norms-and-commitments/comment-page-1/#comment-32998 Pete Wolfendale Wed, 25 Nov 2009 10:29:46 +0000 http://codepoetics.com/poetix/?p=1520#comment-32998 Thanks for picking up on the post. I'm happy to accept that the theoretical move of deflating ontology's ethical pretensions is not necessarily an effective one in relation to explicitly theological positions, not because it's incorrect, but simply because those positions aren't going to abandon their particular understanding of ontology (i.e., as theology) and its sway very easily. Putting the debate surrounding theism (and thus also its ethical-political consequences) on a proper footing is a very difficult task indeed. With regard to neo-liberalism though, I think you're right that its basis has been shifted from some conception of man as homo economicus to a certain conception of the normative structure of rationality, namely, as essentially grounded in personal prudential reasoning, or preference satisfaction. However, the point I would make is that it's not a matter of seeing this kind of rationality as consisting in an optional set of norms that we should reject, to follow some other more egalitarian principles, but rather of showing how this conception of rationality fails to grasp the fundamental norms of rationality proper. The way of undermining neo-liberalism is neither to demonstrate that their conception of man is not ontologically grounded, nor to reject their conception of the norms of action outright, but to show how it fails to grasp the proper normative structure of reason, which already includes the possibility of genuine collective practical reasoning not based on some deeper level of individual preference satisfaction. I wrote a bit more about this here: http://deontologistics.wordpress.com/2009/10/04/explanatory-networks-and-political-reason/ and here: http://deontologistics.wordpress.com/2009/10/06/normativity-causation-and-explanation-revisited/ Thanks for picking up on the post. I’m happy to accept that the theoretical move of deflating ontology’s ethical pretensions is not necessarily an effective one in relation to explicitly theological positions, not because it’s incorrect, but simply because those positions aren’t going to abandon their particular understanding of ontology (i.e., as theology) and its sway very easily. Putting the debate surrounding theism (and thus also its ethical-political consequences) on a proper footing is a very difficult task indeed.

With regard to neo-liberalism though, I think you’re right that its basis has been shifted from some conception of man as homo economicus to a certain conception of the normative structure of rationality, namely, as essentially grounded in personal prudential reasoning, or preference satisfaction. However, the point I would make is that it’s not a matter of seeing this kind of rationality as consisting in an optional set of norms that we should reject, to follow some other more egalitarian principles, but rather of showing how this conception of rationality fails to grasp the fundamental norms of rationality proper. The way of undermining neo-liberalism is neither to demonstrate that their conception of man is not ontologically grounded, nor to reject their conception of the norms of action outright, but to show how it fails to grasp the proper normative structure of reason, which already includes the possibility of genuine collective practical reasoning not based on some deeper level of individual preference satisfaction.

I wrote a bit more about this here: http://deontologistics.wordpress.com/2009/10/04/explanatory-networks-and-political-reason/ and here: http://deontologistics.wordpress.com/2009/10/06/normativity-causation-and-explanation-revisited/

]]>